What was the 2003 Iraq War decision?

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's decision in March 2003 not to commit Canadian Forces to the US-led Iraq War unless there was a UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force was one of the most consequential foreign-policy decisions in modern Canadian history. Chrétien announced the decision in the House of Commons on March 17, 2003, just two days before the US-led invasion began on March 20, 2003. Canada was the only major US ally to decline participation, marking a significant departure from the post-9/11 Canada-US relationship and from Canada's traditional alliance pattern.

The Iraq War context involved disputed claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), Saddam Hussein's alleged links to al-Qaeda, and the Bush administration's unilateral threat of regime change. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) under Hans Blix had returned to Iraq in November 2002 under UN Security Council Resolution 1441 to verify Iraqi compliance with weapons-inspection obligations. UNMOVIC inspectors had not found evidence of WMD stockpiles by early March 2003. The United States, United Kingdom, and Spain proposed a second Security Council resolution authorising force, but withdrew it on March 17, 2003 when France, Russia, China, and the rotating non-permanent members opposed.

Chrétien's decision had several drivers. Canadian public opinion was clearly opposed to participation without UN authorisation (about 65 to 75 per cent in major polls). Quebec opposition was overwhelming (about 85 per cent opposed). Cabinet ministers including Bill Graham (Foreign Affairs), John McCallum (Defence), and Anne McLellan (Justice) were variously supportive of participation if UN authorisation came, but opposed without it. Backbench Liberal MPs were strongly opposed. Chrétien made the March 17 announcement after a Cabinet decision the previous day. He said: 'If military action proceeds without a new resolution of the Security Council, Canada will not participate'.

Canada's non-participation was diplomatically costly. US Ambassador Paul Cellucci publicly expressed disappointment. The federal Liberal government quietly maintained behind-the-scenes assistance, with about 100 Canadian Forces personnel embedded in US units (an exchange programme that had preceded the Iraq War decision and continued during it) and Canadian frigates supporting operations in the Persian Gulf. The federal government doubled the Canadian contribution to ISAF Afghanistan to free up American resources for Iraq. Canadian aid contributions to post-war Iraqi reconstruction reached about 300 million dollars by 2007. Chrétien's decision is now widely regarded as having been vindicated by the war's later controversies, including the absence of Iraqi WMD and the prolonged insurgency. The decision strengthened Canadian foreign-policy independence and is remembered as one of Chrétien's most consequential achievements.